One thing I have noticed in the information age is the side of ones political ideology controls the info they receive. Liberals seek out liberal blogs and newspapers, Conservatives seek out conservative blogs and talk radio. This new opinionated and bias information has a unique component’¦lack of accountability and fact checking. This leads us to what has happened behind the backs of Californians due to this split of information. Liberal fear has crept into our little state’¦.it’s been here all along (remember when you could ride a motorcycle without a helmet, smoke in a bar, or how about passive left turns?) and it is hackable elections. The new Secretary of State Debra Bowen was elected last year if for no other reason that she was a democrat and not from the party of President Bush. And thus as her first duty (catering to a grass roots constituents of nutroots, hippies and tin hat wearing fools) fell for the unfounded fear of hackable election machines (those dirty republicans stole the 2000,2002,2004 elections’¦although she ..a democrat ‘¦as well as the house democrats and senate democrats won’¦go figure). She decertified all of them statewide (at the midnight deadline no less). She gathered all the models up’¦sent them to colleges and handed them the service manuals , she then asked them to hack them. The report came back that they were. (without any explanation as to how or the procedures used to do it’¦ add to that the fact she took away all the external security procedures thus making a fantasyland scenario for testing.) So two things happened’¦. every county ROV and election department discreetly called her a kook and an imbecile, discreetly because in our current legislature’s infinite wisdom they decided to have 3 elections this year’¦each requiring 4-5 months of setup time (the older paper ballot time frame)’¦printing ‘¦distribution’¦.pollster hire’¦pollster train’¦etc’¦etc. (add that up’¦you will see the problem) . But when the hammer comes down at the end of the year…the fact that Bowen created new requirements and laws (the job of the legislature) without authorization will put her in very hot water.

But back to the problem at hand….

So how did California get duped into buying faulty systems ? Well’¦they didn’t. They got what they ordered….what many Election officials and security officials asked for. The counties also have contracts to update machines and security as needed. The mission was to provide external security (tamper proof seals) to a simple multi language, handicapped accessible tabulator that removed voter mistakes (you see ‘¦the 2000 debacle in Florida was caused by voter mistakes) In California we already had regulations in place for paper ballots so that Florida’s problems would not happen here. But the new DRE’™ allows the voter mistakes to disappear’¦no misplaced dots’¦no hanging chads’¦all the required languages’¦.and the kicker’¦SPEED’¦5 times faster than precinct counting of cards’¦transportation’¦recounting cards at central offices’¦verifying. Try counting 2 million cards ‘¦twice. Will you get the results that night?’¦..nope. Ask San Fransisco…they had a paper only contest last year…I still don’t think it has been certified yet (going on 6 weeks now)

So on to the reason for today’s post:
One Department of Elections decided to take the SOS on (and trust me, All of them will after this election cycle is done) Montery County held a grand jury investigation of the security and equipment of the DRE’s. And because it was a matter of public record’¦.something that the nutroot blogs and media outlets don’t report appeared’¦.the security procedures developed by the counties and manufactures (they same manufactures that protect your money in an ATM) developed.

If you feel these procedures (used in multiple counties) are too lax’¦do not trust a Liberal blog or a Hardcore Conservative one(well maybe mine)’¦.find out for yourself ‘¦ask your local election officials or ROV’s they know the system better than anyone’¦and are public servants hired to protect your vote’¦and the kicker…NONE OF THEM HAVE A PARTY AFFILIATION!!! Never trust a third person telling any information’¦I know, I know..that removes almost all Media across the board. But if you look hard enough about stuff you care about’¦.you will get the 1st person information you seek’¦that’s the cool thing about the information age’¦.we can all become our own spokesmen (and women)

Here is the Monterey County grand jury findings’¦.Suck on that Bowen.


Section 8 — Electronic Voting in Monterey County

Summary: Due to numerous concerns voiced by the public prior to the June 6, 2007
elections, the Grand Jury investigated the use of electronic voting machines in Monterey
County. Specifically, the Grand Jury looked into potential security issues implied by the
California Secretary of State concerning the use of electronic voting.

Background: The administration of all Monterey County public elections is the main role
of the Monterey County Elections Department. Its primary function is to maintain the
integrity of the election process. The Monterey County Elections Department provides the
voter a choice between two methods to cast their vote. At the polling place (precinct) the
primary method of voting is through the use of a touch screen Direct Recording Electronic
machine (DRE). Monterey County uses the Sequoia ACV Edge 2 DRE.

The second method available to the voter, either at the precinct or by absentee vote, is the
traditional paper ballot. The review of votes cast by these two methods requires two
separate groups of elections personnel at the Monterey County Elections Department to
perform this duty. DRE’s have been in use for ‘œearly’ voting in Monterey County since
1998 and for full precinct voting since 2005.

The California Secretary of State ordered a full ‘œtop to bottom’ review of each type of
electronic voting machine used in California counties. On August 3, 2007, the Secretary of
State announced the withdrawal of certification and conditional re-certification of Sequoia
DRE’s. On August 9, 2007, the Monterey County Registrar of Voters submitted her reply
to the Secretary of State’s report which was presented to the Monterey County Board of
Supervisors.

Investigative Methodology: The Grand Jury investigation of electronic voting machines
consisted of interviews with at least four Monterey County Elections Department officials.
A thorough review of documentation used in the training of election officers, to include
precinct inspectors and clerks. A complete tour of the Monterey County Elections
Department facility.

Facts Relevant to the Investigation:
1. In 2004 Monterey County had one precinct voting system ‘“ the paper ballot.

2. In 2005 Monterey County had two voting systems- the paper ballot and the Direct
Recording Electronics machine (DRE).

3. As of June 6, 2007 there were 143,553 people registered to vote in Monterey County. Of
these there are approximately 65,000 registered permanent absentee and 78,500 precinct
voters.

4. During the June 6, 2007 elections 41,637 residents voted absentee, 21,019 voted at the
precinct and 188 took advantage of the early voting offered at the Monterey County
Elections Department.

5. The total turnout of voters for the June 6, 2007 election was 62,844, or 43.78% of all
Monterey County registered voters.

6. The Monterey County Elections Department currently has 7 full-time positions to handle
the annual workload/requirement of the election office. Two additional positions will be
added and filled in 2008.

7. Monterey County has 430 Sequoia Edge 2 DRE’s and 1169 printers.

8. On August 3, 2007 the California Secretary of State decertified the use of Sequoia
DRE’s.

9. There are 124 voting precincts in Monterey County, located in approximately 94
locations. Some locations consist of two precincts, or three in one instance.

10. All elections in the State of California are held on the first Tuesday following the first
Monday of the month in which the election is to be held. The Monday before election day
three to five DRE’s are delivered to each precinct. The rest are held in reserve to be
delivered, if required.

11. The security of the DRE’s and printers is maintained in several ways to include both a
continual physical and visual security from the election office to the precinct and while
returning to the election office after the polls are closed.

12. The Monterey County Elections Department is located in a leased facility. The
building does not meet the design requirements needed to be fully functional and efficient.

13. The Monterey County Elections Department uses closed circuit cameras throughout the
entire building to constantly monitor the election office premises including the storage
areas of the DRE’s and printers.

14. All election office exterior doors and windows and numerous interior doors are
protected by alarms.

15. Every DRE used for the vote is secured by the use of three tamper-proof blue seals.
These seals are tamper-proof in that when removed, the word ‘œvoid’ becomes visible on
the seal.

16. Two blue seals are located on the outside — sealing the DRE case and one inside —
sealing the ‘œresults’ cartridge.

17. Monterey County Elections Department policy and procedures require that on Election
Day, prior to setting up the DRE’s and printers, the security of each DRE is maintained
through a two-person custody procedure.

18. Prior to DRE setup the inspector and at least one precinct clerk must verify the serial
number of the DRE and its corresponding seal from a list provided by the Monterey County
Elections Department. Both individuals must verify the numbers and list them on a
‘œReconciliation Form,’ initial the verification form and attach the blue seal to the form.

19. Should the number on the seal and DRE serial number not conform to that listed or if a
seal has been tampered with, the DRE is immediately removed and replaced with another
delivered by the election office.

20. The blue seal on the ‘œresults’ cartridge is not removed until after the polls are closed.
The same procedure applied to the blue seal on the outside of the DRE case is followed in
the removal of this seal.

21. The serial number of each printer, its corresponding red seal number and the serial
number of its DRE must be confirmed by at least two precinct workers and listed on the
reconciliation form. The red seals on the DRE printers are never removed at the precinct.

22. All seals are to be examined, by two election officials, three times during the day while
the polls are open to make sure none have been tampered with.

23. DRE’s are never connected to a phone or computer line, nor do they even have that
capability, as a security ‘œanti-hacking’ measure.

24. DRE and paper ballot security are maintained visually by the precinct workers. No
less than four workers, consisting of one inspector and three clerks are assigned to each
precinct. Additional clerks are assigned to co-located precincts.

25. Monterey County Elections Department policy states that no less than three workers
must be present at the precinct at any given time while the polls are open. However, the
inspector and all clerks must be present from 5 pm until after the polls are closed.

26. No voter is allowed access to the back of the DRE, and no one is allowed to step behind
or touch anything on the back of the DRE.

27. Each Sequoia voting machine has a ‘œyellow button’ on the back of the DRE. This
button is used by the precinct inspector for two functions.
a. First, to eject any activator card which may become jammed in the DRE.
b. Second, to change the voting mode from visual to voice for voters who are visually
impaired.

28. In order to activate the DRE the precinct inspector removes the green security seal,
switches the DRE to ‘œpolls open’ and immediately re-seals it with a new green seal.

29. In order to vote using the DRE the voter must receive a card which is activated by a
precinct clerk.

30. No voter is given an activator card until a DRE is available. This card must be returned
before the voter is allowed to leave the polling place.

31. Once used, the activator card is deactivated by the DRE. An activator card must be
reactivated by a precinct clerk before it can be used by the next voter.

32. After the polls are ‘œclosed’ the security focus shifts to the ‘œresults’ cartridges, printers
and all paper ballots, both used and unused. Once the results cartridges have been removed
from the DRE the DRE no longer functions, until it is reprogrammed for the next election
at the Monterey County Elections Department.

33. A minimum of two poll workers must be involved in each step of the process from the
removal of the ‘œresults’ cartridges to their return to the election office, along with all
printers and used and unused paper ballots. Monterey County Elections Department policy
requires the signature of the precinct inspector to verify their return.

34. The Secretary of State’s original ‘œconditional’ re-certification limited the use of DRE’s
to one per precinct.

35. By order of the Secretary of State, each vote cast on a DRE must be 100 % verified.
The Monterey County Elections Department has stated this decision will significantly
increase the cost of any election and delay the announcement of election results.

36. All voters will be given the option of voting via DRE or paper ballot. The Monterey
County Elections Department stated that long waiting lines will occur when numerous
people choose to vote using the DRE.

Findings:
F 8.1 Sequoia DRE’s used in Monterey County are not and cannot be connected to a
computer either by phone line or wireless. Therefore they cannot be ‘œhacked.’

F 8.2 When allowed ‘œunlimited and uncontrolled access’ (the California Secretary of
State’s method) a DRE could be tampered with. No one is ever given ‘œunlimited or
uncontrolled’ access to the DRE’s in Monterey County.

F 8.3 If an unauthorized person were to push the ‘œyellow button’ nothing will happen.
Only Monterey County Elections Department officials ‘“ with a source code ‘“ can put the
DRE in any mode other than ‘œvisually impaired voter.’

F 8.4 Without an additional security code, the ‘œyellow button’ can only be used by the
precinct inspector or a precinct clerk to eject a jammed activator card or to change the DRE
mode to ‘œvisually impaired voter.’

F 8.5 The Monterey County Elections Department has done an outstanding job of
protecting the security of its electronic voting equipment.

F 8.6 The Secretary of State’s methods used in investigating DRE security bears no
resemblance to Monterey County Elections Department DRE policy or procedures.

F 8.7 There should be unlimited use of DRE’s in Monterey County.

F 8.8 The Sequoia ACV Edge voting DRE used by Monterey County is a secure and cost
effective method of voting.

F 8.9 The 2007 Monterey County Civil Grand Jury has confidence in the Monterey County
Elections Department and its employees in their ability to administer elections.

Recommendations:
R 8.1 The Board of Supervisors and the Monterey County Registrar of Voters should work
diligently and as quickly as possible to reinstate the use of Sequoia ACV Edge voting
DRE’s at all County precincts without conditions.

R 8.2 The Board of Supervisors should provide the funds to the Monterey County
Elections Department for a more suitable facility, perhaps the rehabilitation of an existing
County building.

Response Required to All Findings and Recommendations:
Board of Supervisors

All this ‘¦and you can still vote with a paper ballot’¦or absentee’¦just ask.

Ready to take a step back……
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